Airborne Maritime Surveillance

The MSS 6000 is built for real time monitoring of sea surface activities. Typical missions include: • General surveillance for protection of the Exclusive Economic Zone • Oil spill tracking • Border control • Fishery surveillance • Ship traffic control • Search and rescue

The core of the MSS 6000 is a mission management system that links all available information together and presents a situation overview to the operator for interpretation and further action. The mission management system is based on GIS (Geographical Information System) technology, and the available information is presented against a backdrop of a digital nautical chart. The information from on board sensors and external inputs is presented live to the operator and also recorded digitally for later analysis.

The mission management system generates various reports, of which some can be customised to meet specific requirements. These reports can be viewed, analysed and distributed in real time or filed, compiled and distributed later.

A post-processing station, located at the mission control centre and/or at the aircraft home base will allow replay of the mission data for continued analysis and processing.

Defence policy: Not just a matter for experts

Singapore has witnessed a growing maturity in the level of public debate on social issues. The same, however, cannot be said of the sphere of defence policy, which has largely remained the domain of the professionals — policymakers, practitioners, academics and defence pundits.

Concerns about the level of defence spending and contributions to National Service (NS) have periodically been raised in the blogosphere and other forms of social media, but they lack the same rigorous treatment or sustained traction of social and day-to-day “bread and butter” issues.

Why is the discourse of defence policy in the public space important? Like the debate on other issues in the public domain, a more pluralistic exchange on defence issues, particularly by independent voices not beholden to any interest group, can act as a check against the “group-think” of professionals and the dominance of partisan agendas.

Rather than impede the decision-making process, the rigour of such a discourse will throw out options hitherto hidden by “expert” blinkers and institutionalised biases.

CITIZEN ARMY

More importantly, Singapore cannot afford to have a military that is divorced from its society — like in the case of some countries with professional militaries.

In a military that depends on citizen soldiers as its core, public discourse on the raison d’être of Singapore’s defence policies and issues that directly impact Singapore’s citizen-soldier model has to be strengthened and factored into the crafting of defence policy.

Expanding the process — from the dominant approach of State-led education of citizen-soldiers about the importance of NS, to one where space is created for citizen-soldiers to define for themselves and take ownership of the “why we serve” question — will go a long way in strengthening Singapore’s citizen-soldier model and the Singapore core.

THE EXCLUSIVITY TRAP

One of the most enduring philosophical explanations of the nature of war is to be found in the writings of the 19th century Prussian military thinker, Carl Von Clausewitz.

For Clausewitz, war exists in a Trinitarian relationship between rational forces embodied by the calculated policies of government, non-rational forces encountered by military forces on the battlefield (such as fog, friction, uncertainty, probability and chance), and irrational forces personified by the passion of the people. The passion that fuelled the rank-and-file of France’s citizen-soldiers was harnessed by Napoleon’s military genius to build an empire which was ultimately undone by his ambitious hubris.

Indeed, Georges Clemenceau, the wartime Prime Minister of France from 1917-1920, was known to have remarked: “War is too important a matter to be left to the military”. War, and by that extension defence of the realm, is a matter of national and personal survival that should not be the exclusive domain of military professionals and — in today’s context — other experts.

Beyond the military, other experts such as academics and defence pundits, too, can be susceptible to intellectual biases, dogmatic mindsets and entrenched assumptions that cloud decision-making.

In particular, for some countries with professional militaries, the military profession has become a community apart from the society that it defends. This separation then becomes the breeding ground of military exceptionalism — an inherent belief that only the professionals are qualified to discuss military matters.

In a critique of British military performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, a former British intelligence officer, Frank Ledwidge, argued that the “manifestation of British military exceptionalism” had led to failures at the strategic and operational levels in both military campaigns.

POLICY IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE

In the Singapore Armed Forces, where citizen-soldiers still constitute its core, more can be done to harness the passion of its NSmen, particularly as a “brain trust” to solve problems and improve processes that require skills and ideas not easily found within the defence establishment.

Beyond that, there has to be a greater confidence in the ability of Singaporeans to help shape defence policy through discourse in the public space. That is not to say that such a process is to be encouraged in all areas of national defence. Debate on matters where operational sensitivity is an issue and where the lives of service personnel may be put in danger should be off-limits.

However, when it comes to public discourse on the raison d’être of Singapore’s defence policies and those that directly impact its citizen-soldier model — such as the inclusion of females or non-citizen volunteers in NS — the Government should encourage this process by the dissemination of green papers to solicit the feedback of Singaporeans.

In addition, conditions for the development of a citizen-led rather than professional-led space for a sustained rigorous debate of such issues should be encouraged. A distinct citizen-led discourse does not mean that ideas arising from such a process cannot be incorporated into policymaking — on the contrary, the growth of such a space has the potential of serving as a “public brain trust” for out-of-the-box thinking and problem-solving.

VULNERABILITY AND RESILIENCE

Singapore’s strategic posture at the turn of the 21st century is succinctly explained in an excerpt from a defence policy paper, Defending Singapore in the 21st Century, published in January 2000.

It states: “A small and open country like Singapore is especially susceptible to unpredictable shifts in the international environment. This vulnerability will increase as we become more integrated with the global economy. What happens in another part of the world can have immediate and great spillover effects on our economy and security.

“But we cannot turn back from globalisation. We depend on the world economy for a living. We will have to work more actively with others to safeguard peace and stability in the region and beyond, to promote a peaceful environment conducive to socio-economic development ... The end of the Cold War may have reduced the risk of a superpower conflict, but regional and sub-regional conflicts remain a real possibility.”

By and large, this observation from more than a decade ago still remains an accurate representation of the international system that Singapore is situated in. As a small state, we may be more susceptible to global shifts, but therein lies the imperative of harnessing the collective passion of those who form, and want to be part of, the Singaporean core.

In short, the creation of space for public discourse on defence issues built on public trust will go a long way in creating a “public brain trust” that is resilient, dynamic and passionate about serving Singapore.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Ong Weichong is an Assistant Professor with the Military Studies Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Australia’s many ‘maritime strategies’

The combination of the rise of China, interest in new submarines and debates on the Army’s future role has sparked a renewed interest in maritime strategy. There are several alternative maritime strategies in play, often with stark differences, but perhaps all have a similar fundamental shortcoming.

But first what is a maritime strategy? Most quote the early 20th Century British naval strategist Sir Julian Corbett, who believed that a strategy is maritime when ‘the sea is a substantial factor’. Crucially, he stressed that such a strategy involved joint forces working cooperatively to win a conflict rather than fighting their own separate wars.

Maritime strategies have loomed large in Australian strategic thinking, generally as part of someone else’s maritime strategy or, relatively rarely, independently. In this debate, there aresome (PDF) who devise an Australian ‘continental’ strategic school to rail against, but in so labeling specific strategies they disagreed with, the sea remained a substantial factor. The fundamental reason for disagreement was that the Army didn’t have a role—and thus a funding priority—which they considered essential.

So what maritime strategies are in play today?

• Some propose a sea denial strategy, in which assets like submarines, missiles and maritime strike aircraft prevent an adversary easily using the sea for their purposes. The1987 Defence White Paper was based on this concept, as it built a path to a self-reliant national defence; Hugh White has recently advanced this idea further. Perhaps for similar reasons, the Chinese have also embraced sea denial.
• Others embrace a technological maritime strategy based principally around specific capabilities that are considered especially significant and intrinsically valuable. Amphibious capabilities and large submarines are currently seen in this way. Big LHDs and big submarines are so versatile that many uses will surely be found for them in whatever future strategic circumstances arise. This is a ‘build it and they will come’ maritime strategy.
• The Chief of Navy and James Goldrick propose a more wide-ranging maritime strategy that focuses on using the sea as a means of communication, including protecting Australia’s international trade. In this there are a very large number of ships to be protected, very few are Australian owned and they sail on dispersed sea lanes mainly across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In most cases this would be a strategy that involved many other nations across vast ocean spaces and, if actually adopted, would change our planned force structure significantly.
• There are also strategies of being involved in other people’s maritime strategies. Australia has deployed ships to the Gulf almost continuously from the early 1990s as part of US-led efforts to promote Middle Eastern stability. Recent tensions between the US and Iransuggest that this involvement will persist and in the nearer term may dramatically intensify—our next Middle Eastern war? Closer to home, Ross Babbage believes (PDF) we should be a part of the US AirSea Battle strategy that would fight for sea control against Chinese anti-access sea denial strategies. Andrew Davies sees such a linkage as a major factor influencing the size and cost of our new submarines. Michael Evans though, worries about such involvement negatively impacting Army force structure, and rejects such a strategy.
• Michael instead advocates a maritime strategy of land force expeditionary warfare across the Indonesian archipelago. The concept owes much to the successful island hoping campaigns of WWII (PDF) but it can be argued that the strategic environment is very different today. Instead of outposts of European empires, the archipelago now comprises proudly independent states, mostly democratic and with relatively large land forces. Any Australian intervention would be by invitation only and the sea is unlikely to be a substantial factor in the terms Corbett meant. Certainly sea transport might be essential—just as in supporting the war in Afghanistan—but fighting won’t involve clashes at sea.
• Partly combining all these strategies, the Williams Foundation sets out the operational capabilities Australia should aspire to. This concept—where everybody gets to play—isn’t quite a maritime strategy but rather what one should consist of. The Foundation postulates a scenario where Australia makes an alliance contribution, when the US is committed elsewhere on more important tasks, by mounting a joint force amphibious assault on a distant island against a peer adversary. This sounds somewhat reminiscent of the last days of WWII, when Australia undertook amphibious operations against by-passed Japanese forces while the US drove onto Tokyo Bay and victory. It’s not obvious how valuable that strategy is; Peter Charlton labeled it an unnecessary war.

This criticism highlights what is missing across the various proffered maritime strategies. They don’t clearly communicate how they’ll lead to a successful conclusion of a conflict. If the aim of war is a better peace, not just a return to the conditions that necessitated the war, these strategic alternatives don’t offer a path to this outcome. At the least they need locating within an overarchinggrand strategy that does. In this regard, the maritime strategies advanced are more operational concepts than strategies.

Justin Kelly and Michael Brennan have criticised such a focus on the operational level of war at the expense of considering the ‘bigger’ strategic level picture as at least partly explaining the limited success of recent large scale military campaigns. Historically, free-floating military thought bubbles have proven dangerous. Political leaders can unwittingly allow military forces to act out their aspirations and preferred operational models if there are no other ideas in play. At the start of WWI Kaiser Willhelm II famously complained of just such a conceptual straitjacket when he realized the Germany General Staff could not conceive of any alternatives or even modifications to its preferred Schlieffen Plan.

A sensible maritime strategy might require some more thought to develop and need to be subordinate element of an overarching grand strategy. Fortunately there may be some thinking (here and here) thinking that could be useful in this regard.

Peter Layton is undertaking a research PhD in grand strategy at UNSW. Image courtesy of US Department of Defense Current Photos.

Security challenges in the Asia-Pacific: a US perspective

The United States is prioritising a comprehensive engagement of the Asia-Pacific region. Whether this is called ‘rebalancing’ or not, the US requires growing trade, active but effective diplomacy, and sufficient military investment and presence to promote and preserve a peaceful and prosperous region. However, as I see it, the Asia-Pacific region is beset with at least three somewhat intertwined and hard security challenges: avoiding conflict with an authoritarian North Korea, growing tensions in the East and South China Seas, and managing a more assertive and rising China. While governments have to be concerned with far more than these security challenges, they pose some of the starkest threats to the dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region.

Focusing on China as the starkest long-term geostrategic challenge, many analysts in the US, Australia and the Asia-Pacific region might be quick to dismiss the threat posed by North Korea. But to do so would be a mistake. While conflict on the Korean Peninsula is still likely to be deterred, war is possible. Especially in the wake of recent provocations including the successful Unha-3 rocket and third nuclear tests, there’s no substitute for further strengthening deterrence and defence. Counter-provocation strategies need further attention and must be exercised to ensure better readiness.

From the perspective of the US–Australian alliance, the careful management of the North Korean issue is a prerequisite for achieving regional peace and prosperity. If there is any political will, it might well focus on proposing a peace agreement to replace the 1953 armistice, now declared null by North Korea. Countries like Australia will be important, whether because of its seat on the United Nations Security Council or as a potential partner in debating future strategic moves.

The East and South China Seas also appear to be settling into a long-term state of heightened confrontation. While that confrontation appears manageable, wise statecraft should never be assumed and nationalist fervour is running high in the region.

What is needed moving forward is a mixture of realism, confidence-building measures, transparency, and restraint. The two largest powers, China and the US, have a special duty to secure peace. A good beginning would be to acknowledge that the South China Sea (and to a lesser extent, the East China Sea) is part global good, part sovereign territory. Different national interpretations are inevitable, and being realistic about this fact is an essential beginning point for easing tensions.

The US one day will no doubt learn to live with PLA Navy ships passing off America’s coasts. But for the foreseeable future, issues such as innocent naval passage through exclusive economic zones and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, must be managed rather than settled. Through greater dialogue, trust building and transparency, informal rules of the sea can accommodate both a rising China and a strong America. But the US should simultaneously remain strong—economically and militarily.

This raises the third and related challenge: managing a rising China. China appears to be in the midst of reassessing its strategy after decades of near-continuous policy aimed at a patient approach and a peaceful rise. The visible displays of nationalism over the South and East China Seas suggest that it may well become more assertive and difficult to manage when it comes to defending its interests and creating new military capabilities.

The management of the challenges outlined above will depend on the ability of the US to commit to the rebalance in the foreseeable future, but also the cooperation and involvement of regional partners. To this end, there are five major recommendations or conclusions that I would offer.

The first deals with the overriding American priority of addressing its own problems. If the US can’t put more of its citizens back to work and grow its economy, then the difficult trade-offs regarding budgets, including defence spending, will be even more difficult than they are now.

The second and third recommendations echo the classic advice of Teddy Roosevelt: speak softly and carry a big stick. First the stick; the US needs more, not less, naval and air power. While we need an ability to engage regional partners at their level, we can’t afford to abandon serious combatants or cutting-edge technology. As for speaking softly, a successful commitment to a strong defence posture and genuine, not just rhetorical, rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region should be matter-of-fact and carried out without fanfare. Improbable contingency planning exercises are best done quietly, especially in a region that prefers and expects superficial tranquility regardless of future uncertainty. Importantly, if the United States wishes to support a rules-based regional architecture, then it must seek to strengthen ASEAN-centred institutions, ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, and embrace the Philippine right to third-party arbitration of maritime disputes with China.

The fourth recommendation is to further encourage the active diplomatic and security participation of allies and partners, especially key allies such as Australia, Japan and Korea, as well as a vital partner in India. Budget constraints alone should be sufficient to motivate a shift of some security burdens onto Asian allies and partners, rather successful and growing economies free-riding on the US.

Australia should be spending closer to 2% of GDP on defence rather than its current 1.56% level. The US needs Australia to play a vital role in the South Pacific, the southern Western Pacific, and into at least the crucial Malacca, Lombok and Sunda straits leading into the South China Sea. Australia’s engagement with states such as Indonesia remains critical. And its key training areas in the Northern Territories and elsewhere remain excellent places to build interoperability with other modern militaries. In the longer run, greater naval access to HMAS Sterling, through shared joint facilities rather than any permanent US bases, would be ideally suited for operations throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

Fifth and finally, the US and its allies should never forget that the overriding political objective of strength is to create a durable, rules-based system that supports more democratic freedom, open and fair trade, and clear rules of the road for resolving disputes and averting conflicts. Within this system, establishing a cooperative framework for greater commerce with China based on real reciprocity and cooperation on selective global issues is essential. Through a dynamic equilibrium that accommodates power shifts and other international changes, the United States hopes not only to perpetuate its own influence for decades to come, but to nudge forward a regional security architecture supportive of freedom in all its dimensions: across the maritime and air, cyber, and outer space dimensions of the global commons; through inclusive, open but fair trade and through more democratic institutions able to protect human liberty.

Patrick M. Cronin is a senior advisor and senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Image courtesy of The White House.

MBDA reports SIMBAD-RC order

Published: Feb. 19, 2013 at 12:45 PM

PARIS, Feb. 19 (UPI) -- European missile manufacturer MBDA has won its first export order for its SIMBAD-RC naval air defense system.
The system was launched as a self-financed development project about a year ago and prototypes are in production.
The systems ordered, MBDA said, will be delivered to the unidentified customer in 2015 and eventually be installed on patrol vessels.
"The SIMBAD-RC program gives a clear demonstration of MBDA's ability to help customers unlock additional capabilities from their previous acquisitions," said MBDA Chief Executive Officer Antoine Bouvier.
"Building upon a market standard like the Mistral missile -- of which 17,000 units have already been produced -- we have developed a simple, highly automated system that largely extends the operational use of the missiles that are already in service."
MBDA, owned by BAE Systems, EADS and Finmeccanica, describes the SIMBAD-RC as a remotely controlled, very short-range naval air defense system against threats such as fighter aircraft, anti-ship missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. Each of its remotely operated turrets holds two ready-to-fire Mistral missiles.

Boustead suffers heavy losses

Shipbuilder and defence engineering company Boustead Heavy Industries suffered a net loss of RM112.3 million for the year ending 2012, compared to net  profits of RM18.5 million recorded a year ago, due mainly to a one-time cost overrun on its shipbuilding business.

For the fourth quarter alone, its losses were also sharply higher at RM59 million, compared to RM2.5 million losses in the same period a year ago, the company said in a statement to Bursa Malaysia. Boustead however said it expected business to rebound in 2013, aided by subsidiaries undertaking maintenance, repair and overhaul of naval ships, submarines and helicopters and an end to its shipbuilding cost overruns.

“With the completion of the final commercial shipbuilding project in January 2013, the heavy engineering’s segment will not incur further cost implications of this nature,” it said.

The company said that it’s revenue rose 36 percent to RM214 million and 19 percent to RM544 million respectively for the fourth quarter and the whole of 2012, over the previous periods a year ago.

Rising defence related projects such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project and chartering of vessels contributed positively to its revenue even as the company suffered some setback as three chemical tankers were impaired.

LIMA 2013: BHIC Clinches RM 47.4 Million Deal With MINDEF

Boustead Heavy Industries Corp (BHIC) has won contracts worth RM 47.4 million from MINDEF which include three year installation, service and supply contract for maintaining RMN’s Eurocopter AS-555SN Fennec worth RM 32.4 million (here) as well as RM 15 million worth of contract for maintenance, repair and supply of spares for Oerlikon 35mm gun and Skyguard radar for a period of three years. 

BHIC Aeroservice will be maintaining six of the RMN’s Fennecs while BHIC Defence Techservice will be responsible to work on the Oerlikon 35mm gun and the Skyguard radar.

All deals were signed during LIMA 2013 on March 28. 

Previously, an RM 182 million contract has been secured from BHIC subsidiary Contraves Advanced Device from Boustead Naval Shipyard (BNS) for RMN’s littoral combat ship (LCS).

BHIC Aeroservice had also secured the exclusive right as Eurocopter’s sole MRO center for military helicopters operated by the Government. This has been signed during the first day of LIMA 2013.

With Courtesy from:

malaysiaflyingherald

LIMA 2013 - Boeing in talks with local aerospace players

Boeing in talks with local aerospace players

LIMA 2013 - 24 deals worth RM4.2b inked at Lima 2013

24 deals worth RM4.2b inked at Lima 2013

LIMA 2013 - French company keen to invest in Malaysia over long term

French company keen to invest in Malaysia over long term