Wednesday, 29 April 2026

MINDEF PROCUREMENT AND THE INTEGRITY AROUND IT. MALAYSIA SEAPOWER

 We are comfortably in denial of the fact that most defence contracts are simply enrichment schemes with post retirement benefits. The divide and rule principle has reached the climax. No argument on this. 

The deafening silence of the realms is a constant testimony to the state of affairs. We have become a laughing stock in the region for force planning and capability enhancement. Nothing can save us now. We just continue being the pendulum in global affairs and pretend the problem will not reach us. Meanwhile, with only 35 million population dependent on foreign workers, we have no say in International Relations and are hostages to regional powers. They will politically intimidate us and take sovereign territory in time to come. 

Truth be told. Time to relax and enjoy the remaining years…maintain camaraderie and praise yourself for the cherished Service to King and Country.

We are ahead of ‘Laos’! Maybe!! Others in ASEAN, not even closed on Defence Strength and capabilities.!! Real Sad!!

What is the use of white paper or any strategy for that matter if not in control of assets (weapon platforms).

Already a decade past and planned and procured assets still have not passed the construction stage

What is the “ideal” force level for the MAF, particularly for the Navy, based on valid “threat perception” and taking into account the RMA brought about by advanced military technology? What is the current defence shortfall (risk factor) based on current “available” force level? and how does this risk gap is managed? Is the current force structure development plan commensurably aimed at closing this risk gap, or the Government simply pick and choose on ad-hoc basis to quickly enrich some? What are the true constraints in these development? Is it technological, financial, man power resources or structural procurement system? We are not sure. Perhaps the Navy think thank knows best these challenges.

The RMNOA & RMN SEAPOWER CENTER  are in a position to institute a Think Tank Group to propose the Strategic Proposals to the country...Any takers to take the lead?






 “Sources” of Sea Power 

(1) A maritime community 

(2) Resources 

(3) Styles of government, and 

(4) Geography and geopolitics. 

“Elements” of Sea Power 

(1) Shipping 

(2) Bases, and 

(3) The fighting instrument (ie the Navy viz the sharpest end of Sea Power. My view - the main culprit that stunts Malaysia’s Sea Power is “The style of government” whose law makers could not perceive these sources and elements, what more how to synergies them, beyond discussing the trivial eg prices of chicken eggs, collapsing bridges, road repairs, etc 

 The parade ground on the Navy Day reflects “a maritime community” which the Government must continue to develop right from school age through structured plan and development.




Briefly, by “maritime community” is meant the pool of people who man the Navy, merchant marine and other sea-oriented entities particularly those in the off-shore labyrinth and fishing fleet. In Malaysia, this would include those manning the para-military APMM, marine police, marine department, fishery department, the custom and immigration, etc. Why this community constitutes an important source of Sea Power is because they are interdependent, mutually supporting and mutually influencing in the Sea Power development. The merchant marine brings wealth through trade, given 90% of Malaysia’s trade is sea-borne in nature. Such wealth, in part, is needed to finance and develop a powerful Navy, being the fighting instrument and sharpest end of Sea Power. For this reason, a credible Sea Power hinges not only on developing a powerful Navy but also a strong commercial shipping industry that supports it. In turn, the Navy must protect the merchant marine in peace time and more so in war. The importance of merchant marine, thus sea-borne trade, is evident in the crippling of Venezuela, Cuba and Iran of their Sea Power by the US Navy blockades. Merchant mariners not only play the role of bringing wealth necessary for Navy, thus Sea Power, development. In the 1982 Falklands War, the UK Government requisitioned 64 commercial ships (Ships Taken Up From Trade - STUFT) in the war for various auxiliary roles. 


The same can be said on the wealth-bringing off-shore labyrinth (oil and gas fields) vis-a-vis the Navy it helps develop. In turn, the Navy provides security for their operations.
Though insignificant it may seem, the fishing fleet provides an important reservoir of seamen. When the crunch comes and the Navy badly needs civilians to augment the ship crew, twenty land lubber taxi drivers from KL will be no match to one weather bitten fishermen from Pangkor to do the job - a special breed of seamen of the maritime community. 


from RMNOA Think Tank


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