Battle of the Spratly Islands

Vietnam fought China in the South China Sea before and it should be ready to do so again.

By Koh Swee Lean Collin and Ngo Minh Tri

March 20, 2018                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

The visit to Vietnam by the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Carl Vinson on March 5 is symbolic on multiple fronts. It is the first such port call to Vietnam by an American aircraft carrier since the end of the war in 1975. Plus Da Nang, where the port call took place, was also the site of the initial U.S. Marine Corps landings on March 8, 1965. Finally, as some commentators have pointed out, the move symbolizes the increasingly closer relations between Vietnam and the United States on the defense and security front, especially following the earlier decision by Washington to lift the decades-old arms embargo on Hanoi.

Whether this latest visit would once and for all exorcise the ghosts of the Vietnam War — a protracted, bloody conflict that inflicted grievous losses on both sides in blood, sweat and treasure — remains to be seen. But both capitals have been optimistic about the long-term trajectory of this budding bilateral relationship, which has been carefully cultivated since the end of the Cold War. That coincided back then with Hanoi’s recalibrated foreign policy, which favors independence and nonalignment/alliance, instead embracing a more outward-looking posture aimed at promoting regional economic integration, which serves the domestic agenda of “Doi Moi” (Renovation) socioeconomic development process that still continues today.

Another observation about the Carl Vinson visit is that it took place just about a week before the 30th anniversary of the Battle of the Johnson South Reef on March 14, 1988. This episode, along with the earlier Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974, which was fought between South Vietnam and China, would not have been unknown to Vietnamese military planners. These two battles saw the tactical and strategic defeat of Vietnamese forces at Chinese hands – Beijing cinched the prizes of occupying the concerned features to this day and did so at a fraction of the losses inflicted upon Vietnam.The 1988 Spratlys Battle

Hanoi certainly harbors no illusions about a future naval skirmish with Beijing. Both ruffled each other over the Chinese oil rig HYSY-981 in 2014, in an almost two-month-long standoff off the Paracels. Though China subsequently removed the platform, which thus could be painted as a victory for Hanoi, the lessons were hard won. That episode fortuitously did not escalate into a full-blown shooting clash similar to the 1988 event, but Vietnamese forces were exhausted by the grueling showdown. Ultimately, an asymmetry in materiel and manpower between the maritime forces of the two rivals was just too huge.

In a future standoff with China, Vietnam would first have to contend with China’s maritime militia and coast guard on the frontlines. But it is the People’s Liberation Army Navy, which lurks in the shadows ready to leap forward to back up its paramilitary counterparts, that is of most concern. The 1988 battle saw the PLA Navy deploy three frigates – Nanchong, Xiangtan, and Yingtan – pitted against landing craft and troop transports of the Vietnam People’s Navy. The results were thus preordained. No way could these lumbering, lightly armed vessels would fare well against the fast and heavily armed Chinese warships. The Vietnamese lost three ships and more than 60 men in the short, but sharp battle.

The China Shadow

China is no doubt looming large at the back of the minds of the leaders in Hanoi and Washington as they reach out to each other.

Hanoi has made no bones about its sense of unease regarding Beijing’s growing material might and in parallel, its increasing assertiveness. This is evident with China’s continued militarization of its artificial islands in the South China Sea at the same time it is putting up “smile diplomacy” outreach to ASEAN and calling for cooperation, including an agreement to begin formal negotiations on the proposed Code of Conduct. Vietnam’s concerns about the future of the disputes were further heightened after the ruling Chinese Communist Party proposed sweeping reforms to the Chinese Constitution, including the removal of clauses mandating that the president would serve no more than two terms in office – thus creating the prospect of Xi Jinping holding onto power for perpetuity.

One needs no reminder that China’s muscle flexing in recent years took place under Xi’s watch. This can only mean the possible likelihood of “business as usual” – and even a worsening of future scenarios in the South China Sea – under a protracted Xi rule. The current Sino-ASEAN concord over the disputes is far from assured, and could take an abrupt turn downhill at any point of time. What appears to remain constant is Beijing’s incessant buildup in and around the disputed Paracel and Spratly Island groups. While the “black box” of Chinese policy elites’ true intentions is always murky, those sprawling bases on the fake islands are an undeniable fact – clear as crystal.

Therefore, the Carl Vinson visit is indeed opportune. This ought to be taken as a concerted series of measures by Hanoi to send a serious signal to its vastly more powerful neighbor up north. Just before the carrier visit took place, Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang called on New Delhi, one of Hanoi’s closest partners. During the visit, both countries agreed to work together to build “an independent, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific region” – which seems to bear strong resonance to the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept championed by Japan, another of Vietnam’s closest partners.

In recent years, more and more foreign naval ships have visited Vietnam’s ports. Before the visit of USS Carl Vinson, numerous Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers visited Vietnames ports. Australian, Indian, and  Japanese gunboats also made port calls in Vietnam; notably, last year, the helicopter destroyer JS Izumo (DDH-183) visited Vietnam in its first overseas voyage. While China builds more aircraft carriers, Japan had planned to convert the Izumo-class into true aircraft carriers, which could even bring F-35B fighters to combat. So Izumo’s trip in the South China Sea appeared to signal a challenge to China.

Last year, Australia sent the HMAS Ballarat, an Anzac-class guided missile frigate to visit Da Nang. In September 2017, the Indian Navy’s stealth frigate INS Satpura (F48) and the anti-submarine warfare corvette INS Kadmatt (P29), carrying a total of 645 officers, visited Hai Phong city. It is noteworthy that these port calls were conducted by the four members of the revived quadrilateral security cooperation framework, the so-called diamond alliance. Together, their warships have made their presence known in the South China Sea, a bridge to connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Of Ties and Weapons

Despite all the diplomatic niceties one could observe taking place since the ASEAN summit in August last year, the risk of future conflict in the South China Sea endures. While the prospect of promulgating a Code of Conduct remains uncertain at best, Hanoi appears certainly to be preparing for the worst. The 1974 and 1988 battles serve as a warnings from history. Yet the geopolitical context is much different; thus according Hanoi a much wider range of strategic options in terms of ties and weapons.

Where ties are concerned, the post-Cold War foreign policy recalibration gives Vietnam a hitherto never-before-seen berth of avenues with diverse countries. Of course, Hanoi has strived to maintain its traditional friendships with former communist-bloc nations, primarily Russia. However, it has also managed to cultivate closer ties with the West. In the immediate Southeast Asian region, Vietnam no longer stands out like a “Soviet client” sore thumb, but has been fully accepted as a member of ASEAN and over the decades proven to be an avid advocate of the regional bloc and its ideals for a regional security architecture, which envisages an inclusive approach toward roping in surrounding powers like Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to own a veritable stake in Asian peace and stability.

The post-Cold War environment to this day also opens up to Vietnam another valuable avenue for its defense capacity-building. While it continues to incline toward Russia for the bulk of its “big ticket” military items, Vietnam has availed itself of other sources such as Israel, the Netherlands, and Sweden for niche capabilities. In the current context, Hanoi needs more time to eventually wean itself off its heavy reliance on Russian weapons, with the attendant risks of being cut off from  supplies in times of a conflict with China due to the stronger Sino-Russian strategic ties following the Ukraine crisis in 2014. To date, through this approach of gradually diversifying its arms sources, Vietnam has been able to build a more robust military, including a navy that is unlike its predecessor in 1988.

Realist Calculations in a Future Contingency

Notwithstanding the vastly different strategic context Vietnam finds itself situated in today, there is no room for complacency. Vietnam should expect to fight China again if push ever comes to shove. Entertaining this prospect is not far-fetched, if one takes it seriously Beijing’s threat in August 2017 to attack Vietnamese forces in disputed waters unless Hanoi were to demand that the Spanish energy firm Repsol stand down from its work in an offshore hydrocarbon block claimed also by China. Hanoi did capitulate eventually, and Repsol stood down.

But clearly, Vietnam does not wish to appear weak in front of China. Credibility is at stake, with both domestic and external repercussions for the ruling elite in Hanoi. And by now, after seeing the way ASEAN intramural dynamics play out over many years on the South China Sea disputes, Hanoi would have reached the dire conclusion that the bloc, if there is ever going to be an outright shooting war with China, would not offer a united stance except perhaps to issue an obligatory statement calling upon all sides to cease fighting and negotiate a settlement. Some of the individual ASEAN member states may even overtly take Beijing’s side, or just stay neutral. At best Vietnam could rely on ASEAN as a bedrock for postconflict economic recovery, even though such a prospect is still far from certain considering the bloc’s economic interdependence with China and possible economic retaliation by the latter.

It is most likely that Vietnam would receive support from multiple major powers in times of a war with China over the South China Sea flashpoint, but not direct military intervention, especially if Beijing elects to keep the clashes localized and well contained to avoid provoking an overwhelming international response. As such, Hanoi could expect those friendly extraregional powers to cheer for it, or at best offer diplomatic condemnation against Beijing, and possibly some form of materiel and technical aid for its fighting efforts. But not more than that.

If that fateful day eventually come, will the United States flex its muscles with a carrier strike group somewhere close to Chinese shores or near the scene of battle, and will that make any difference to the outcome? Perhaps, but nobody can be sure.

Koh Swee Lean Collin is research fellow with the Maritime Security Programme, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 

Ngo Minh Tri conducts research on international security affairs, and is a managing editor of ThanhNien newspaper in Vietnam.

Royal Malaysian Navy commissions two training ships

The Royal Malaysian Navy commissioned its two new training ships, KD Gagah Samudera and KD Teguh Samudera, in a ceremony at the TLDM Lumut naval base on April 26.

Thursday’s commissioning ceremony was historic in that it marked the first time the Malaysian Navy commissioned two ships in a single day.

The two 76-meter vessels were commissioned together despite the fact that the first vessel in the class, KD Gagah Samudera, started training deployments in March 2017.

The vessels have a range of 2,500 nautical miles and accommodate 60 trainees. One 30mm and two 12.7mm machine guns additionally enable the ships to carry out patrol tasks.

A contract for the construction of Gagah Samudera and Teguh Samudera was signed between the defense ministry and Malaysia’s NGV Tech who was to work together with South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) on the delivery of ships to the Malaysian Navy.

The NGV Tech shipyard was foreclosed by Maybank soon after the second of two ships was launched in February 2013 and another shipbuilder, Grade One Marine Sdn Bhd, was contracted to complete and deliver the ships.

Teguh Samudera, the second of two ships in the class, was delivered to the navy by Grade One Marine earlier this month.

by Naval Today 27 April 2018

Malaysia’s Election and Southeast Asia: Issues and Implications

The upcoming Malaysian GE14 on May 9, 2018, has been dubbed as the most unpredictable and competitive general election in the history of the nation. The Barisan Nasional (BN) government, helmed by Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, who is facing strong challenges to his political legitimacy and survival, is doing all it can to stay in power. Najib’s key opponent is none other than former mentor and premier of Malaysia Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, as he leads a spirited but fragile Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition.

Similar to previous elections, the battle lines of GE14 will be drawn mainly on domestic issues rather foreign affairs. In fact, there is a dearth of scholarly literature examining the precise relation between Malaysia’s foreign policy and general elections. Yet, one cannot ignore the fact that foreign policy issues, including Southeast Asian affairs, have been featured in Malaysia’s general elections, albeit in a low-key manner. And GE14 is no exception.

Malaysia’s Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: PH vs BN

Comparing the GE14 manifestos of the BN government and PH coalition, some observations could be made. The PH manifesto, Buku Harapan, devotes about three pages to Malaysia’s foreign affairs on the global stage and in Southeast Asia as well (see pages 153 to 155). This is unlike the GE13 manifesto of PH’s predecessor, Pakatan Rakyat, which had almost no reference to foreign policy matters.

With regard to Southeast Asia, the PH coalition intends to raise Malaysia’s prominence in ASEAN. For example, Malaysia would play a more active role in regional groupings such as the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA); and building up the economic, political, security, and sociocultural aspects of the ASEAN community. More resources would be directed to Wisma Putra (Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) so as to strengthen the country’s representation at the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The PH manifesto also advocated support for the Rohingya. The manifesto even indicated that Malaysia will be positioned as a Middle Power.

In contrast, the BN manifesto, Bersama BN Hebatkan Negara, has grouped foreign policy issues under the section on safeguarding national sovereignty and security of the people. While it does not explicitly mention Malaysia’s role in ASEAN, it briefly states some policy goals in the context of Southeast Asia. For instance, it highlights continuing efforts to resolve regional conflicts in southern Thailand, southern Mindanao in the Philippines, and Rakhine state in Myanmar; and expanding regional defense diplomacy with countries that share borders with Malaysia (see page 90).

Indeed, Malaysia’s mediation and humanitarian efforts in regional conflicts within Southeast Asia have been a highly symbolic means of demonstrating the country’s leadership and influence within ASEAN. One could expect the BN government to maintain these endeavors without much disruption if it is returned to power after GE14.

It is not far-fetched to suggest these endeavors would continue even if the PH coalition wins the election. PH’s foreign policy objectives regarding Southeast Asia and ASEAN, as outlined in its manifesto, share fundamental similarities with existing and well-established features of Malaysia’s foreign policy thrust, namely that ASEAN is a cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign affairs.

Yet without details on how to achieve these objectives, it is unclear how a PH government could outperform the BN government in foreign policy ventures, let alone match Mahathir’s foreign policy achievement in propelling Malaysia to global prominence as a champion of the Islamic world and developing countries, and ASEAN multilateralism.

Southeast Asia: An Arena for Malaysia’s GE14

Right from the start of his tenure, Najib has sought to enhance Malaysia’s global standing, including its influential standing in ASEAN. Success in foreign policy is important for Najib, as it would contribute to boosting the image and legitimacy for the BN government back home. The reason for this is apparent. The Najib regime has had to contend with a strong domestic political opposition, which made significant strides in the 2008 elections. The BN government’s GE13 electoral setback in 2013, and mounting political, economic, and societal challenges in recent years, have further weakened Najib’s leadership considerably.

At this point, one might even question whether foreign policy achievements are politically expedient at all during elections, especially since Najib’s penchant for foreign policy ventures and highlighting successes in this arena did not seem to have worked in his favor during GE13. Yet one cannot deny that since 2013, the BN government has tried to ensure, or at least give the appearance, that its foreign policy follows closely to what was outlined in its GE13 manifesto. For example, Malaysia, as ASEAN chair in 2015, helped in the realization of the ASEAN economic community in that year. Malaysia has also continued to engage in humanitarian efforts in conflict zones, such as Mindanao, southern Thailand, and more recently, Rahkine state.

Malaysia’s humanitarian support for the Rohingya Muslim minority is not only aimed at demonstrating leadership in ASEAN affairs. Since the 2013 electoral setback, the Najib government has resorted to conservative Islamization in Malaysia in an effort to shore up the regime’s Islamic credentials and secure the support of the Malay-Muslim community. Thus, the BN government’s concerns for the plight of the Muslim Rohingya is mostly likely a politically shrewd tactic, as it feeds into the religious rhetoric that is being projected by the country’s ruling elites.

However, the single most important foreign policy issue for GE14, which has stolen the limelight, is Malaysia’s ties with China. It is not surprising that the BN government has been establishing stronger ties with China so as to improve economic performance and political legitimacy. One of the most visible sign of this is Malaysia’s deep entrenchment in China’s Belt and Road initiative.

Najib’s attempt to draw closer to China has incurred strong criticisms from the PH coalition over perceived negative economic, political, and social outcomes for Malaysia. Yet Sino-Malaysia relations are not merely a domestic political controversy, as it has strategic implications for Southeast Asia as well.

Najib’s foreign policy has sought to build up Malaysia’s position as a key conduit through which China-ASEAN relations can improve significantly. Likewise, China’s political elites recognize that Sino-Malaysia relations are at the forefront of China’s ties with ASEAN. For China, building stronger relations with Malaysia is a significant means to expand China’s economic interests, prominence, and influence throughout Southeast Asia.

To be sure, Malaysia is unlikely to become another Cambodia, through which China could exert undue pressure to alter regional affairs in its favor. Malaysia has consistently sought to pursue an independent, nonaligned, and neutral foreign policy. Malaysia has also been striving to hedge between China and the United States, ostensibly through economic relations with the former and security arrangements with the latter to offset potential risks associated with the rise of China.

Nevertheless, it is uncertain how Malaysia could continue to maintain this delicate balance in the future, given Malaysia’s increasing economic dependence on a rising and increasingly assertive China. Gradually, Malaysia’s leaders may find themselves having less room for maneuver to stave off China’s political and economic pressure to augment Malaysia’s posture in the region. If Malaysia’s foreign policy autonomy erodes because of China’s pressure, Malaysia’s claims to be a credible leader to galvanize ASEAN to engage China through rules-based interactions is at risk.

Conclusion

At this stage, it is still too early to gauge the actual impact of the aforementioned developments on the upcoming elections, let alone the outcome of GE14 on Southeast Asia affairs. It is quite certain, however, that foreign policy issues will be played up by both sides of the political divide to maximize gains for this elections.

In the event that the PH coalition wins the elections (though this is unlikely), it would be the first time in Malaysia’s history that a non-BN government steers the nation’s foreign policy. It would also usher in a new era and new dimension to the evolution of Malaysian diplomacy.

Of course, should the BN government retain power, it cannot afford to rest on its laurels, and assume that it can carry on its foreign policy conduct away from the close scrutiny of political opposition and public opinion in Malaysia. The events leading right up to GE14 show that future analysis of post-GE14 elections must reckon with the realities of growing domestic contestation over foreign policy.

By David Han Guo Xiong

April 23, 2018

This article is part of a series of commentaries by RSIS on the 14th Malaysian General Election.

David Han Guo Xiong is a Senior Analyst with the Malaysia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Malaysia Deployed Warship for RIMPAC 2018

Malaysia will send a warship to fully participate in the world’s largest international maritime exercise for the first time.

This week, Malaysia’s navy chief confirmed that the Southeast Asian state would for the first time send a warship to fully participate in this year’s iteration of the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises, the world’s largest international maritime exercise.

Malaysia’s involvement in RIMPAC, which takes place biennially in the summer months in waters around the Hawaiian Islands and southern California, is not new. It has previously participated in the exercises, and even before that, it, like some other countries, had sent observers to the drills in past iterations in a small scale.

But there had been indications ahead of RIMPAC 2018 that Malaysia would be deploying a warship this year for the first time. For instance, earlier this month, when Military Sealift Command’s dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Washington Chambers conducted an underway replenishment with the Royal Malaysian Navy’s KD Lekiu, the engagement was publicly billed by the U.S. Navy as a means to allow the ship to increase its range and transit further east in support of RIMPAC 2018 later this year.

This week, in further confirmation of this, Admiral Ahmad Kamarulzaman Ahmad Badaruddin, the commander of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), confirmed that Malaysian warship KD Lekiu would be away for three months for activities related to RIMPAC. “This is the first time the ship and its crew of 27 will be participating in RIMPAC for three months,” local media outlets reported Kamarulzaman as telling an audience at the Defense Services Asia (DSA) Exhibition and Conference and National Security Asia (Natsec) 2018 at the Malaysia International Trade and Exhibition Center.

Malaysia’s expansion of its role in RIMPAC is far from surprising. Malaysia already participates in several bilateral and multilateral exercises involving the United States .

 It has also been receptive to expanding the extent of its involvement in some of those drills over time, even as it remains open to such opportunities with other countries as well, including newer partners like China 

Kamarulzaman did not publicly disclose additional specifics about Malaysia’s participation. But he framed Malaysia’s participation at RIMPAC 2018 as an illustration of the RMN’s commitment to defense diplomacy and enhancing interoperability of its assets, especially given the role of the exercises within the broader context of the regional and global maritime space.

The KD Lekiu is expected to set sail next month and join 51 vessels and five submarines for RIMPAC 2018. As that occurs, it will be interesting to see how the shape of Malaysia’s participation plays out at RIMPAC 2018, as well as in the iterations that follow.

By Prashanth Parameswaran

April 20, 2018

Navy buys RM601 mil worth of missiles from Norway-based company

The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) has bought €125 million (RM601 million) worth of Naval Strike Missile (NSM) rounds from Norway.

According to British-based military magazine, IHS Jane’s 360, Kongsberg Defence Systems (KDS), one of four wholly-owned subsidies of Norway’s Kongsberg Gruppen (KOG), confirmed the receipt for the rounds.

KOG is an international technology group that supplies high-technology systems and solutions to customers in the merchant marine, defence, aerospace, and offshore oil and gas industries.

The report said KDS announced the sale at the Defence Services Asia (DSA) 2018 exhibition in Kuala Lumpur yesterday.

The announcement comes three years after Kongsberg received a letter of award from Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd in Lumut, Perak, to provide NSM shipboard equipment for the RNM’s six-ship Littoral Combat Ship programme.

NSM was originally developed by Kongsberg to meet the Royal Norwegian Navy’s (RNoN) requirements for a highly discriminative, low-observable surface-to-surface guided weapon able to penetrate shipboard defences and operate effectively in both blue water and littoral environments.

Kongsberg entered service with the RNoN in October 2012.

Navy in Sabah’s east coast now battle-ready

Zam Yusa

 | December 28, 2017

Esscom’s planned Ligitan security post to be beefed up

Esscom welcomes green light on pursuits into Philippines

Zam Yusa

 | January 31, 2018

KOTA KINABALU: The Eastern Sabah Security Command (Esscom) has welcomed Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s go-ahead for Malaysian troops to enter Philippine waters in pursuit of terrorists.

On Saturday, Duterte declared that Malaysian and Indonesian vessels were now free to enter Philippine waters for this purpose.

Speaking to the media on his return from a state visit to India, Duterte said all Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur had to do was alert the Philippine armed forces about their operations to hunt down terrorists in Philippine territory.

“We’ve been waiting for this for a long time, since last year. We really welcome this new development.

“The clearance to enter our neighbours’ waters will be part of a trilateral maritime security agreement,” Esscom chief Hazani Ghazali told FMT, adding that the matter had been discussed by Malaysia’s defence and foreign ministers with their Philippine and Indonesian counterparts.

Hazani said the clearance to enter foreign waters would be a mutual agreement between all three countries.

“We hope security can be further boosted in the waters between the three countries.

“There will certainly be procedures to follow when we enter the neighbouring nations’ waters in pursuit of criminals and terrorists.

“We expect this to be a trilateral arrangement, so we can enter each other’s waters while chasing pirates, kidnappers and militants.”

The opening of maritime borders is expected to cut the lag time between when a Malaysian vessel halts its pursuit and when the neighbouring country continues the chase.

In his announcement on Saturday, Duterte said Philippine authorities would also assist in the operations carried out by Malaysia and Indonesia.

He added that he had informed his Indonesian and Malaysian counterparts about the matter.

“I also said if it’s terrorists, my advice to them is just blow them up.”

Esscom oversees security in the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (Esszone), a special security area spanning some 1,700km of coastline in the east coast of Sabah.

Esscom and Esszone were formed following the 2013 Lahad Datu intrusion by militants sent by the so-called Sulu sultanate in southern Philippines to stake their territorial claim on Sabah.

The security in the waters between the three countries was at its highest level during the Marawi war between Philippine troops and pro-Islamic State groups, between May and October last year.

It was feared that terrorists would run away to Indonesia and Malaysia following heavy offensives by the Philippine military to flush them out of the city.

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Heightened security measures in Sabah waters show results

FMT 1 Feb 2018

KUALA LUMPUR: Improved security measures in Sabah and its surrounding waters have produced quantifiable results, according to a report in The Diplomat.

No kidnappings, for instance, took place the whole of last year and there has been no repeat of the 2013 incursion into Sabah by armed Sulu residents. And despite the Islamic State’s stated wish to target Malaysia, there has been no major terrorist attack. The report also noted the increased allocations to the Eastern Sabah Security Command (Esscom).

Prime Minister Najib Razak had allocated RM250 million to Esscom, including RM50 million for coastal surveillance radar, under Budget 2018.

Esscom was set up soon after the 2013 attempt by about 200 men loyal to the Sultan of Sulu to reclaim Sabah for the sultanate ended with 68 deaths. It is tasked with the security of the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (Esszone), a 1,700km-long special security area along the east coast of Sabah that borders crime-prone southern Philippines.

“We are happy to say that no acts of piracy and kidnapping happened in the Esszone so far this year thanks to the vigilance of our troops and cooperation of citizens,” its chief Hazani Ghazali told FMT recently.

“We don’t compromise with the state’s security, so we are doing everything we can to increase our capabilities to tackle elements of crime and terrorism that approach our country. Our secret is that we frequently train and rehearse so that when the time comes, we’re ready for action. That is why we constantly keep our troops at the leading edge of combat capabilities,” he added.

This new defence architecture covers ten districts along the eastern coast, which are patrolled by police officers, army personnel, and members of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency.

The report in The Diplomat noted that more police stations and detention centres had been built in Sabah, and naval capabilities upgraded.

It said if militants were present on any notable scale within Sabah, they were lying low in the face of the enhanced security measures put in place.

It added that the authorities had refuted any suggestion that local Muslim communities were harbouring Islamic fighters from the southern Philippines.

“So far, the knock on effects of the instability to Malaysia’s east appear to have been limited, and Sabah’s tourism industry continues to thrive. The economic benefits derived from a stable environment make the region’s power brokers all the more determined to avoid a deterioration of security akin to Mindanao.”

It said the authorities in Sabah know they must exercise continual vigilance amid fears of terrorist infiltration driven by the risk of fighters returning not only from Mindanao, but also from the Middle East as Islamic State loses territory there.

Islamic State’s lingering regional ambitions remain a threat.

“Due to its geographical position, Sabah will remain at risk despite the best efforts of the security forces and law enforcement agencies. Its long and heavily indented coastline along with its proximity to the impoverished and lawless islands of the Sulu archipelago, awash with armed Islamist groups, will continue to make Sabah an attractive gateway for militants intent on not only resurrecting past territories, but with eyes on carving out new ones.”

Navy in Sabah’s east coast now battle-ready

FMT 

Zam Yusa

 February 21, 2018

KOTA KINABALU: The navy’s Second Fleet headquarters (Mawilla 2) based in Sandakan is now ready for duty in Sabah’s east coast, after being relocated from Kota Kinabalu recently, its commander said.

Rear Admiral Abdul Rahman Ayob said he was satisfied with the readiness of the fleet and its crew in facing off any situation at sea.

“It is important that we are ready for any eventuality and threats, especially in the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (EssZone) in the state’s east coast.

“Yesterday, we finished an exercise for our fleet and I’m satisfied with the level of preparedness,” he told FMT.

According to the rear admiral, Mawilla 2 completed the second series of its Borneo War Exercise at Sulu Sea.

The exercise involved five navy ships — the KA Tun Azizan, KD Todak, KD Baung, KD Sri Johor and KD Sri Perlis — as well as the CB90 assault boat and Silverbreeze intercept boat.

The KA acronym represents “auxilliary ship”, as opposed to the main fleet of “royal ships”, KD.

“This was our first exercise this year and second one after the relocation of our fleet from Kota Kinabalu,” said Rahman, who participated in the exercise aboard the KD Todak.

The EssZone spans 1,700km of coastline of Sabah that faces conflict-prone southern Philippines.

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte recently announced that Malaysian and Indonesian security agencies, including their navies, can now enter his country’s waters in hot pursuit of criminals.

The EssZone encompasses land and maritime areas, partly covering the Sulu and Celebes Seas, well-known as a hotspot for kidnappings and sea-jackings by trans-border criminal groups from southern Philippines.

Security at the EssZone was at its highest level during the five-month Marawi war between Philippine troops and pro-Islamic State groups amid concern that militants would flee to Sabah.

Thanks to efforts by the Eastern Sabah Security Command (EssCom), which is in charge of security in the EssZone, no incidents of kidnapping and robberies were recorded last year

Malaysia's MINDEF to Purchase Of Airbus C295 ?

SINGAPORE -- There is no hint as yet from Malaysia’s Defence Ministry (Mindef) on the possible purchase of the Airbus C295 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) for the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF).

The aircraft was displayed in Malaysia in July last year and three months after its two-week tour of Asia, Defence Minister, Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein announced that the armed forces would receive more than 20 new assets under the Budget 2018.

The Minister also said under the Asset, Safety and Training Preparedness Agenda, among others, the air force would get four units of maritime coast guard planes to monitor the South China Sea and Malacca Straits coastlines.

Airbus’ Head of Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR) and Tactical Aircraft, Fernando Ciria said the C295’s reliable long time on station in combination with its Fully Integrated Tactical System (FITS), make it the perfect platform for Malaysia’s maritime patrol missions.

"The C295 has solutions that can be tailored to Malaysia’s maritime needs,” he told a roundtable session with selected Malaysian media on the sidelines of recent Singapore Airshow 2018.

He indicated that Airbus welcomed an opportunity to show the Malaysian government, in a tender, that the MPA is the best option to meet the country's requirements.

He described the C295 as a high versatility aircraft with many variants and multiple missions.

“Most of the different variants can easily be re-configured to a transport version and back, due to the palletised modular mission systems,” he said.

Malaysia together with the Philippines and Indonesia launched the Trilateral Air Patrol in October last year, on growing concerns over Islamic State in the region.

The joint air patrols complete the trilateral military collaboration in the Sulu Sea following the launch of the Trilateral Maritime Patrols six month earlier.

The air forces of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are currently using the C295, a new generation tactical airlifter.

Malaysia currently employs Beechcraft King Air B200Ts for maritime patrols, as well as CN235 and C-130 Hercules transports.

According to industry observers, to reflect the RMAF’s preference for new aircraft, Malaysia may consider the Bombardier Q400, Airbus C295 or ATR 72.

However, the observers said secondhand Lockheed Martin P-3C Orions from Japan could be an alternative as the Japan Air Self-Defense Force is replacing it with the Kawasaki Heavy Industries P-1.

In tabling the Budget 2018, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak announced an allocation of RM14 billion for Mindef, a billion off from the previous budget.

Airbus has so far delivered 165 of the C295, also a twin-turboprop tactical military transport aircraft that can fly up to 11 hours.

At a cost of about US$28 million per unit, total orders of the C295 currently stand at 206.

-- BERNAMA