By Ryan Browne,
CNN Updated 0833 GMT (1633 HKT) June 6, 2018
Two US B-52 bombers flew within the vicinity of the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea on Tuesday, according to a statement from US Pacific Air Forces, which oversees air operations in the region.
The flyover came days after Secretary of Defense James Mattis called Beijing out over its militarization of the islands, accusing China of "intimidation and coercion" in the Indo-Pacific, making clear the US has no plans to leave the region and prompting a furious Chinese response.
Beijing claims the Spratly Islands, but those claims aren't recognized by the US or by China's neighbors -- Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan -- which also say the islands are theirs. China has used geographic features in the Spratlys to build man-made islands, some of which it has equipped with military facilities, including anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles.
A US defense official who has knowledge of the mission's original flight plan said it called for the nuclear capable B-52 bombers to fly about 20 miles from the islands.
A spokesman for the Pentagon said the mission involved the Guam-based bombers conducting "a routine training mission," flying from Andersen Air Force Base in the US territory of Guam "to the Navy Support Facility" in the United Kingdom's Indian Ocean territory of Diego Garcia.
On Tuesday, the bombers flew from Diego Garcia and conducted "training" in the vicinity of the South China Sea, returning back to Diego Garcia the same day, according to the statement from US Pacific Air Forces.
CNN initially reported that the flyover took place Monday, based on information from the US defense official who later clarified that the flyover took place Tuesday and not during the initial leg of the aircraft's journey Monday from Andersen to Diego Garcia.
Both flight operations were part of US Pacific Command's "Continuous Bomber Presence" missions, which the military says are intended to maintain the readiness of US forces.
"US Pacific Command's CBP missions, which have been routinely employed since March 2004, are flown in accordance with international law," said Lt. Col. Chris Logan, a Pentagon spokesman.
Tuesday's flyover came after Mattis used a Saturday speech in Singapore to accuse China of "intimidation and coercion" in the region and declared that the United States does not plan to abandon its role there.
"Make no mistake: America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay," Mattis said. "This is our priority theater."On Tuesday, the bombers flew from Diego Garcia and conducted "training" in the vicinity of the South China Sea, returning back to Diego Garcia the same day, according to the statement from US Pacific Air Forces.
CNN initially reported that the flyover took place Monday, based on information from the US defense official who later clarified that the flyover took place Tuesday and not during the initial leg of the aircraft's journey Monday from Andersen to Diego Garcia.
Both flight operations were part of US Pacific Command's "Continuous Bomber Presence" missions, which the military says are intended to maintain the readiness of US forces.
"US Pacific Command's CBP missions, which have been routinely employed since March 2004, are flown in accordance with international law," said Lt. Col. Chris Logan, a Pentagon spokesman.
Tuesday's flyover came after Mattis used a Saturday speech in Singapore to accuse China of "intimidation and coercion" in the region and declared that the United States does not plan to abandon its role there.
"Make no mistake: America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay," Mattis said. "This is our priority theater."
Mattis specifically called out Beijing's militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea, home to some of the world's busiest sea lanes. "We are aware China will face an array of challenges and opportunities in coming years, we are prepared to support China's choices if they promote long-term peace and prosperity for all in this dynamic region," Mattis said.
The Pentagon last week ratcheted up rhetoric about China's militarization of islands in the South China Sea, even as the Trump administration presses China for cooperation on North Korea.
When asked by a reporter about the ability of the US to "blow apart" one of China's controversial man-made islands, Lt. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, director of the Joint Staff, told reporters, "I would just tell you that the United States military has had a lot of experience in the Western Pacific taking down small islands."
His comments -- a reference to US amphibious landings and capture of Japanese held islands during World War II -- come amid growing tension in the hotly contested region, as the US ramps up freedom of navigation operations in response to China's steady militarization of its artificial islands.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the United States had to stop "hyping up" China's action in the South China Sea, describing recent statements by Washington as "blatant lies."
"If someone frequently flexes his muscles or snoops around your house, shouldn't you raise your alertness and improve your defense capabilities?" she said at a regular press briefing Wednesday.
"China will not be intimidated by any planes or ships. We will only be firmer in our resolve to take all necessary measures to safeguard our sovereignty and security as well as maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea."
MAY 25, 2018
Subi Reef, built up by Chinese, appears nearly ready to host first troops based in heart of South China Sea
BY GREG TORODE AND SIMON SCARR
MAY 3, 2018
China installs cruise missiles on key South China Sea outposts
BY JESSE JOHNSON
China has secretly installed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems on three of its fortified outposts in the South China Sea, a report said Wednesday, as Beijing seeks to further project power in the disputed waters.
CNBC, citing sources with direct knowledge of U.S. intelligence reports, said that the missile platforms had been moved to outposts on the Spratly group of islands within the past 30 days. Such a deployment would be the first to the Spratlys, which are located some two-thirds of the way east from southern Vietnam to the southern Philippines. Several Asian nations, including Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines, have rival claims there.
If confirmed, the placement of the defensive weapons would come on the heels of China’s recent installation in the South China Sea of military jamming equipment, which disrupts communications and radar systems.
According to the report, China has deployed the anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef. The land-based YJ-12B anti-ship cruise missiles allow China to strike surface vessels within 295 nautical miles (545 kilometers) of the reefs, while the long-range HQ-9B surface-to-air missiles can target aircraft, drones and cruise missiles and are believed to have a range of 160 nautical miles (300 kilometers).
Satellite images have shown that China has also deployed HQ-9B surface-to-air missiles to Woody Island, its military headquarters on the nearby Paracel Islands, which are also part of the South China Sea.
“China’s activities in the Paracels are clearly a blueprint for their plans in the Spratlys,” said Bonnie Glaser, who heads the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington. “Both anti-ship cruise missiles and HQ-9 surface to air missiles have been deployed on a rotational basis to Woody Island.”
Beijing has built up a series of military outposts in the South China Sea as it seeks to reinforce effective control of much of the waterway, through which $3 trillion in trade passes each year. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei also have overlapping claims.
It has also built seven man-made islets in the Spratlys, with three — Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs — all boasting military-grade airfields, despite a 2015 pledge by Chinese President Xi Jinping not to further militarize them.
China’s Defense Ministry has said the moves are “the natural right of a sovereign nation” and “help safeguard national sovereignty and security,” while also serving “to ensure regional peace and stability.” It has said the moves “are not directed at any country.”
While global attention has been fixated on the North Korean nuclear crisis since early last year, China has further fortified its man-made outposts in the disputed South China Sea in a bid to create fully functioning air and naval bases, according to experts.
It has completed or is close to completing a number of structures, including administrative buildings, improved hangars, missile shelters, underground storage areas, and large radar and sensor arrays.
“I think the Chinese know that the regional states and outside powers, including the U.S., are expecting such deployments and have discounted them already,” said Glaser. “They calculate that the reaction will be relatively moderate and will not undermine Chinese interests. All attention is riveted on North Korea.”
Glaser said the next step in the chain would likely be the deployment of Chinese fighter jets to the three big islands on a rotational basis, as well as military exercises involving assets deployed on the islands.
China has used its increasingly potent military to show that it refuses to be pushed around in its own back yard. It has flown heavy bombers for “combat air patrols” over the contested waters in recent months, part of what it calls “routine” flights in the strategic waterway.
Last month U.S. Navy Adm. Philip Davidson, the expected nominee to replace outgoing U.S. Pacific Command chief Adm. Harry Harris, described China’s increased presence in the South China Sea as “a substantial challenge to U.S. military operations in this region.”
In written testimony to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Davidson said the development of China’s forward operating bases in the hotly contested waters appear to be complete.
“The only thing lacking are the deployed forces. Once occupied, China will be able to extend its influence thousands of miles to the south and project power deep into Oceania,” Davidson wrote. “In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States
APR 5, 2018
How Beijing is winning in the South China Sea
BY PETER APPS
LONDON – Last month, the USS Carl Vinson became the first American aircraft carrier to visit Vietnam since the Vietnam War ended in 1975. Coming alongside the news that a record 23 nations from Southeast Asia and beyond would be joining biennial naval exercises in the eastern Indian Ocean, it was a potent reminder of just how eager the nations surrounding the South China Sea are to embrace powerful allies to fend off a rising China.
But as Beijing’s regional clout continues to grow, it can be hard for weaker nations to resist it, even with these allies’ support. Barely three weeks after the Carl Vinson’s visit, the Vietnamese government bowed to Chinese pressure and canceled a major oil drilling project in disputed South China waters.
It was yet another sign of the region’s rapidly shifting dynamics. For the last decade, the United States and its Asian allies have been significantly bolstering their military activities in the region with the explicit aim of pushing back against China. But Beijing’s strength and dominance, along with its diplomatic, economic and military reach, continue to grow dramatically.
In recent days, Beijing has conducted major military drills, including reportedly sending its aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait and flying jets between Japan’s southernmost islands (the latter of which was explicitly described by the Chinese military as a preparation for future wars). These drills are both a response to recent U.S. military actions and a bold statement of China’s intent to keep up the pressure.
Western military strategists worry that China will, in time, be able to block any activity in the region by the U.S. and its allies. Already, satellite photos show China installing sophisticated weapons on a range of newly reclaimed islands where international law says they simply should not be present. In any war, these and other new weapons that China is acquiring could make it all but impossible for the U.S. Navy and other potential enemies of China to operate in the area at all.
A simple issue lies at the heart of the problem — Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea basin. That assertion — first made by the exiled Republic of China government in Taiwan in 1947 and then repeated by its mainland communist counterpart since — was flatly rejected by a United Nations tribunal in 2016. But that hasn’t stopped Beijing from doing more and more to secure its position in the area.
China’s increasing confidence in asserting control over the South China Sea has clearly alarmed its neighbors, particularly the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, all of whom have competing territorial claims over waters that China claims for itself. But it also represents a major and quite deliberate challenge to the U.S., which, as an ally to all these nations, has essentially staked its own credibility on the issue.
Over the last several years, it has become common practice for U.S. warships to sail through nearby waters, pointedly refusing to acknowledge Chinese demands that they register with its unilaterally declared air and maritime “identification zones” (which the U.S. and its allies do not recognize). The last such voyage — dubbed a “freedom of navigation” operation or, in naval parlance, a “FONOP” — took place March 23, when the destroyer Mustin reportedly passed within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, which is claimed by both China and the Philippines.
The Mischief Reef FONOP fits a much wider pattern of increasingly assertive naval activities by Washington and its allies in the region. Earlier in March, the U.S. announced the first deployment of its cutting-edge F-35B vertical takeoff Joint Strike Fighter — by far the most sophisticated aircraft of its type — to an amphibious assault ship in the region.
This kind of military tit for tat appears to be escalating; China now says it plans monthly military exercises in the South China Sea, a substantial increase. That will likely be met by intensified American and allied activity: A British warship is shortly scheduled to conduct its own FONOP, and the U.S. has pushed Australia to join the program (although whether it will do so remains a topic of considerable debate within the country).
None of this, however, addresses the seismic regional change produced by China’s island-building strategy. Over the last five years, China has built ever more sophisticated military and industrial outposts on disputed atolls and reefs, in some cases transforming scrubby patches of rock that barely broke the surface into large concrete installations.
Once a tiny fishing station on stilts, Mischief Reef is now a well-armed Chinese military base. And China’s land-reclamation efforts continue, aided by a giant new dredging vessel that its Chinese designers have touted as a “magical island-building machine.” Filipino officials say they believe it is only a matter of time before Beijing makes similar moves at Scarborough Shoal, within striking distance of major Filipino population centers and military facilities.
If and when that happens, the Philippines, along with the U.S., will face a difficult decision about how best to respond. At stake here are more than energy resources — although the estimated 11 billion barrels of oil and nearly 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas that the South China Sea is believed to contain are clearly a factor in the conflict.
But more broadly, China sees this confrontation as a test case for its ability to impose its will on the wider region — and so far it is winning. (At the very least, foreign energy firms are now unlikely to bid to drill in disputed waters; Spanish oil firm Repsol is said to have lost up to $200 million after Chinese pressure prompted Vietnam to cancel its planned exploration.)
The U.S. remains the world’s pre-eminent military superpower, and there is little doubt it could win a fight with China almost anywhere else in the world. In its own backyard, however, Beijing is making it increasingly clear that it calls the shots. And for now, there is little sign anyone in Washington — or anywhere else — has the appetite to seriously challenge that assumption.
MAR 26, 2018
Why the South China Sea is critical to security
BY BRAHMA CHELLANEY
CANBERRA – When the U.S. aircraft carrier, Carl Vincent, recently made a port call at Da Nang, Vietnam, it attracted international attention because this was the first time that a large contingent of U.S. military personnel landed on Vietnamese soil since the last of the American troops withdrew from that country in 1975. The symbolism of this port call, however, cannot obscure the fact that the United States, under two successive presidents, has had no coherent strategy for the South China Sea.
It was on President Barack Obama’s watch that China created and militarized seven artificial islands in the South China Sea, while his successor, Donald Trump, still does not seem to have that critical subregion on his radar.
In fact, with Trump focused on North Korea and trade, China is quietly pressing ahead with its expansionist agenda in the South China Sea and beyond. At the expense of its smaller neighbors, it is consolidating its hold by constructing more military facilities on the man-made islands and dramatically expanding its presence at sea across the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific.
It was just five years ago that China began pushing its borders far out into international waters by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. After having militarized these outposts, it has now presented a fait accompli to the rest of the world — without incurring any international costs.
These developments carry far-reaching strategic implications for the vast region stretching from the Pacific to the Middle East as well as for the international maritime order. They also highlight that the biggest threat to maritime peace and security comes from unilateralism, especially altering the territorial or maritime status quo by violating international norms and rules.
The Indo-Pacific region, which extends from the western shores of the U.S. to eastern Africa and the Persian Gulf, is so interconnected that adverse developments in any of its subregions impinge on wider maritime security. For example, it was always known that if China had its way in the South China Sea, it would turn its attention to the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. This is precisely what is happening now. An emboldened China has also claimed to be a “near-Arctic state” and unveiled plans for a “polar Silk Road.”
In fact, with the U.S. distracted as ever, China’s land-reclamation frenzy in the South China Sea still persists. China is now using a super-dredger, dubbed by its designers as a “magical island-building machine.”
China’s latest advances are not as eye-popping as its creation of artificial islands. Yet the under-the-radar advances, made possible by the free pass Beijing has got, position China to potentially dictate terms in the South China Sea. Last year alone, China built permanent facilities on 290,000 square meters of newly reclaimed land, according to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.
In this light, U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea cannot make up for the absence of an American strategy. FONOPS neither deter China nor reassure America’s regional allies.
Indeed, China’s cost-free change of the status quo in the South China Sea has resulted in costs for other countries, especially in Asia — from Japan and the Philippines to Vietnam and India. Countries bearing the brunt of China’s recidivism have been left with difficult choices. Japan, of course, has reversed a decade of declining military outlays, while India has revived stalled naval modernization.
China’s sprawling artificial islands that now double as military bases are like permanent aircraft carriers, whose potential role extends to the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific.
Beijing’s growing strategic interest in the Indian Ocean region has been highlighted by its establishment of its first overseas military base at Djibouti, its deployment of warships around Pakistan’s Chinese-built Gwadar port and its acquisition of Sri Lanka’s strategically located Hambantota port under a 99-year lease. China is also acquiring a 70 percent stake in Myanmar’s deepwater Kyaukpyu port. A political crisis in the Maldives, meanwhile, has helped reveal China’s quiet acquisition of several islets in that heavily indebted Indian Ocean archipelago.
Against this background, the rapidly changing maritime dynamics in the Indo-Pacific not only inject strategic uncertainty but also raise geopolitical risks.
Today, the fundamental choice in the region is between a liberal, rules-based order and an illiberal, hegemonic order. Few would like to live in an illiberal, hegemonic order. Yet this is exactly what the Indo-Pacific will get if regional states do not get their act together.
There is consensus among all important players other than China for an open, rules-based Indo-Pacific. Playing by international rules is central to peace and security. Yet progress has been slow and tentative in promoting wider collaboration to advance regional stability and power equilibrium.
For example, the institutionalization of the Australia-India-Japan-U.S. “Quad” has yet to take off. The Quad, in fact, remains largely inspirational. In this light, the idea of a “Quad plus two” to include France and Britain seems overly ambitious at this stage.
If and when the Quad takes concrete shape, Britain and France could, of course, join. They both have important naval assets in the Indo-Pacific. During French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent New Delhi visit, France and India agreed to reciprocal access to each other’s naval facilities, on terms similar to the U.S.-India Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement.
Unless the Quad members start coordinating their approaches to effectively create a single regional strategy and build broader collaboration with other important players, Indo-Pacific security could come under greater strain.
If, under such circumstances, Southeast Asia — a region of 600 million people — is coerced into accepting Chinese hegemony, it will have a cascading geopolitical impact in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. China has employed a dual strategy of inducement and coercion to divide and manage the countries of Southeast Asia.
In the South China Sea, China is unlikely to openly declare an air defense identification zone as it did in the East China Sea. Rather it is expected to seek to enforce an ADIZ by gradually establishing concentric circles of air control after it has deployed sufficient military assets on the man-made islands and consolidated its hold over the subregion.
China could also declare “straight baselines” in the Spratlys, as it did in the Paracels in 1996. Such baselines connecting the outermost points of the Spratly island chain would seek to turn the sea within, including features controlled by other nations, into “internal waters.”
To thwart China’s further designs in the South China Sea and its attempts to change the maritime status quo in the Indian Ocean and the East China Sea, a constellation of democratic states linked by interlocking strategic cooperation — as proposed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe — has become critical to help institute power stability. The imperative is to build a new strategic equilibrium, including a stable balance of power.
Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, including the award-winning “Water: Asia’s New Battleground.”
The Japan TImes
FEB 7, 2018
ASEAN hopes to expedite South China Sea code of conduct, but no deal expected within year
SINGAPORE – The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is hoping to expedite negotiations on a code of conduct with China for the disputed South China Sea but it isn’t realistic to expect an agreement within a year, Singapore’s defense minister said Wednesday.
China and the 10-member ASEAN bloc adopted a negotiating framework on the code in August and have commenced talks on the code itself over the disputed and busy waterway largely controlled by China but also claimed by some ASEAN states.
“We hope it will be expedited but it’s a very, very complex issue,” Singapore Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen told reporters after a gathering of ASEAN defense chiefs.
“It’s a century’s old dispute. Expecting (the code) in one year is just unrealistic,” he said.
ASEAN and China have hailed the conclusion of the negotiating framework as a sign of progress.
However, the failure to outline as an initial objective the need to make the code legally binding raised doubts about the effectiveness of the pact.
Signing China up to a legally binding and enforceable code for the waterway has long been a goal for claimant members of ASEAN, some of whom have sparred for years over what they see as China’s disregard for their sovereign rights and its blocking of fishermen and energy exploration efforts.
Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said Tuesday some of his ASEAN colleagues had expressed concerns about ongoing activities by China in the disputed areas of the South China Sea, including land reclamation.
Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines all claim some or all of the South China Sea and its myriad shoals, reefs and islands.
Singapore has taken over the role of chairing ASEAN for 2018 and hosted meetings of the group’s foreign and defense ministers this week.
