US Navy Chief: We Will Lay Out Clear Plan for Littoral Combat Ship

LCS already in the topic of disagreement on their combattant capabilities between the Navy people and the congress. It's an amazing thing that they both can talk a same frequency, agree to disagree and fight to the edge for betterment of the NAvy. Of Course end of the day, there will be only one party benefit from this: the naval system contractor.
I really hope that this similar environment could happen in Malaysia. We want our politician have a sound knowledge of security, naval operation, military requirement, its important and its latest technology. And they can fight together with the user, Royal Malaysia Navy to get an appropriate budget from the treasury. Too much to ask? We are lucky if they can spell LCS in full sentence.




The ship that was to revolutionize surface warfare has been controversial since its inception 12 years ago. But the firestorm over the littoral combat ship might have been avoided had the Navy better explained the rationale for the ship and answered critics' questions more clearly, said Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert.

"There are still questions" about the future of LCS, Greenert told reporters May 21. Among them is how the Navy will address testers' concerns that the ship is too lightly armed and susceptible to enemy attacks. Former Deputy Defense Secretary Christine Fox called LCS a "niche platform" that can only operate in "permissive" environments. 

Greenert said those are valid questions that Navy leaders have not answered as comprehensively as they should have. "We probably should have been more clear. Now we will be," he said.

Growing doubts about LCS led Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to truncate the program from the Navy's original goal of 52 ships down to 32. Hagel has asked the Navy to rethink how it might build a future small surface combatant and to evaluate more “capable and lethal” alternatives to the LCS.

Greenert insisted that it was the Navy's plan all along to upgrade the ship over time and improve its survivability, but that the concept was not communicated properly. 

"I don't think we made any mistakes per se, but I think we could have been more clear on our intention for taking the sea frame and evolving it through the life of the ship," he said. Greenert noted that some of the Navy's most successful ship classes grew in fits and starts, not unlike LCS. The Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate had four flights, he said, using the Navy term for technology updates. The Spruance-class destroyers went through two flights and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers had four.

"We never really articulated formally or discussed the feasibility of having flights" in the LCS program, nor has the Navy explained "how we intended to upgrade it for survivability," said Greenert.

That issue was at the center of Hagel's decision to stall the program. He has asked the Navy to explain how the LCS will evolve, said Greenert.

There are currently two LCS variants — the Freedom-class monohull built by Lockheed Martin and the Independence-class trimaran made by Austal. Both were built to be outfitted with "mission modules" of weapons, unmanned underwater vehicles and other equipment for surface warfare, mine countermeasures or anti-submarine warfare.

"This is a very transformational concept," said Greenert. "As with any first of class ship and aircraft, complications emerge."

Why the ship ended up being the subject of relentless criticism is not anyone's fault in particular, said Greenert, who declined to point fingers. "I don't want to be judgmental." 

Within the Navy, leaders had become complacent and comfortable that the program was on track, he suggested. With Hagel's review, the service has a fresh opportunity to make its case for a future small surface combatant and ensure it is funded in the 2016 budget, Greenert said.

One of the reasons why the Navy did poorly at selling LCS within the Defense Department and to Congress, he said, was turnover and difficulties managing changes that were made over the years to ship designs and to procurement strategies. "People change offices. It was very difficult to keep up, I think." Now, he added, "We've reached a node where people are saying we need to take a deep breath and take another look at this."

Greenert and Navy Secretary Ray Mabus in March created a small surface combatant task force to study LCS alternatives. Led by John Burrow, executive director of the Marine Corps Systems Command, the group isevaluating industry proposals and by July 31 will recommend which ideas merit further consideration.

“If we go to a new design, it has to be mature,” Greenert said. “If something is compelling, but would take more time, we'll relay that to the secretary.”

Cost also will be major concern. The rising price of LCS — from initial estimates of $220 million per ship to more than $700 million — nearly sank the program in its earlier days. If a new ship is deemed unaffordable, the Navy might consider upgrading existing LCS vessels with offensive and defensive weapons and sensors.

Congress, meanwhile, is becoming increasingly skeptical. The House Armed Services Committee approved cuts that would leave the program with insufficient funds to procure three LCS in fiscal year 2015. “Deferring additional ships into fiscal year 2016 would compound the already significant challenges the Navy faces in funding the shipbuilding account in a fiscally constrained environment while increasing overall costs to the Navy and increasing risk to the industrial base, including sub-tier suppliers,” the Obama administration said in a statement.

Photo Credit: Navy

Article from: National Defence 

5/21/2014

By Sandra I. Erwin

The Critic:

The problem with the US Navy LCS-class is...WHAT does it DO? 

* It has no sonar, and thus has no torpedo tubes---it has no ASW outside of the HH-60R helicopter 
* It has no anti-ship missiles or heavy missiles 
* It has limited anti-air missiles (SeaRAM isn't really SAM, it's CIWS Anti-missile missile) 
* It has no mine-sweeping equipment 
* It's 57mm gun is proven not to be able to hole a steel-sided warship as a Canadian wargame exercise proved (and caught on film) 
* The press says its 30mm autocannons in the ASuW mission package has been proven to be unstable when the ship moves at speed...it cannot lock and fire at 40kts. 
* It has no ASW or AA module suites whatsoever 
* It has no spy sensors or ECM suite 
* It has no missiles that can reach beyond 5KM (those on the HH-60R don't count). 

So, sure, there's harsh criticism at the LCS because so far it's been shown to sail with the USN flag and be helpful in chasing down Go-Fast drug boats in the Gulf.  Other than that, it assumes the role of the USCG NSC and is thus armed as such.  It's a ship, yes, new hull, but basically WHAT does it DO?  Shrug, it's a light fast gunboat, basically.  Sure, it's better armed than an Avenger-class minesweeper, but no one has called the LCS a minesweeper yet.

Look up the capability of a Perry class frigate.  It had an air defense missile system, a capability to fire Harpoon missiles, a larger gun, torpedo tubes as well as a helicopter capability.  It had a significant ASW sensor suite.  The LCS has none of these except the helicopter.  So to argue that the LCS was intended to replace the Perry class frigate, given the list of deficiencies that Peter noted, is to say that the Navy has traded something for virtually nothing. As far as mine sweeping, the current LCS does not have a capability - it, like the other modules is only forthcoming.  There are 13 mine countermeasures ships listed in the fleet.  They can actually sweep mines.  To argue that we needed 52 LCSs for mine countermeasures seems to be a misplaced sense of priorities. 

As for Greenert's argument that classes of surface combatants have  evolved and added capabilities over that evolution is true. However, the critical difference is that a Flight 0 Arleigh Burke destroyer, while not having a flight deck, had a capable air defense system, long range anti-ship missile system, CIWS, a ASW sensor suite and a Tomahawk launching capability.  It was a flexible, lethal vessel that only added more capability as it evolved.  In contrast, the LCS can do almost nothing except chase drug runners, pirates and purportedly defend against swarms of small high speed lightly armed    attackers - clearing out Iranian Guard speedboats in the Straits of Hormuz has been mentioned as a unique capability.  If that is all that the LCS can do as currently configured, then we have spent a great deal of money to buy a very limited mission set. 

US NAVY LCS : Integration with Gun SYstem not succesful

The Navy adopted a concurrent design-build strategy for the first two LCS seaframes, which has proven unsuccessful. Contributing challenges included the implementation of new design guidelines, delays in major equipment deliveries, and an unwavering focus on achieving schedule and performance goals. These events drove low levels of outfitting, out-of-sequence work, and rework-all of which increased construction costs. Also, incomplete designs during construction led to weight increases for both seaframes. According to the Navy, this weight growth contributed to a higher than desired center of gravity on LCS 1 that degraded the stability of the seaframe. In fact, an inclining experiment performed during acceptance trials showed LCS 1 may not meet Navy stability requirements for the damaged ship condition. The Navy is taking steps to remove weight and implement stability improvements for LCS 1, while also incorporating design changes for future seaframes.

In March 2009 the Government Accountability Office found that Fifteen of 19 critical technologies for the two seaframe designs were fully mature, and 2 technologies are approaching maturity. The overhead launch and retrieval system in the LCS 1 design and the aluminum structure in the LCS 2 design are immature. The Navy identified the watercraft launch and recovery concept as a major risk to both seaframe designs. This capability is essential to complete the LCS anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures missions. According to the Navy, industry watercraft launch and recovery designs are unproven.

To mitigate risk, the Navy is conducting launch and recovery modeling and simulation, model basin testing, and experimentation and is encouraging the seaframe industry teams to adopt similar approaches. Final integration of mission package vehicles with each seaframe will not occur until post-delivery test and trials-planned first for LCS 1 in 2010 using the mine countermeasures mission package. Any problems detected could require redesign and costly rework, which could delay the introduction of LCS to the fleet.

The Navy assesses LCS design stability by monitoring changes to requirements documents, execution of engineering change proposals, and the completion of contract deliverables related to drawings, ship specifications, and independent certification of the design. Construction is monitored using earned value management and through evaluation of manufacturing hours spent on rework, deficiencies detected and corrected, and the number of test procedures performed.

As part of LCS 1 acceptance trials, the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) identified 21 critical "starred" deficiencies and recommended the Chief of Naval Operations authorize delivery of LCS 1 after correction or waiver of these deficiencies. According to Navy officials, only 9 of these deficiencies were corrected prior to delivery. Navy officials report that transiting the ship away from Marinette, Wisconsin, prior to the winter freeze was a higher priority than timely correction of starred deficiencies. The Navy intends to correct remaining deficiencies during planned post-delivery maintenance availabilities. The Navy plans to hold an INSURV review of LCS 2 upon completion of construction and builder's trials for that seaframe. Navy officials report that the earned value management systems in each of the LCS shipyards do not meet Defense Contract Management Agency requirements for validation. Thus, the cost and schedule data reported by the prime contractors cannot be considered fully reliable by the Navy when evaluating contractor cost proposals or negotiating for construction of follow-on ships.

The Navy stated the LCS program is delivering vital capabilities to the fleet and will be a critical component of the Navy. It noted that LCS 1 was delivered September 18, 2008-6 years and 1 day after the LCS program was established. In fiscal year 2009, the program will deliver a second ship of a completely different design. According to the Navy, while the initial cost and schedule objectives were overaggressive - and necessitated a concurrent design and construction plan - they provided the tension and urgency for these achievements, and lessons learned will be applied to future shipbuilding programs. In August 2008, INSURV evaluated LCS 1 and found it to be "capable, well-built, and inspection-ready." The Navy stated it is leveraging lessons learned from LCS 1 and LCS 2 to ensure future ship awards provide the right mix of capability and affordability.

Operation of the MCM, SUW, and ASW packages on the LCS requires a total of 25 critical technologies, including 13 sensors, 5 weapons, and 7 vehicles. Of these technologies, 17 are currently mature and 8 are nearing maturity.

The first of 24 MCM packages was delivered in September 2007 and included 7 of 10 planned mission systems. Four systems are not yet mature; two of these are struggling to reach full maturity. Officials note the Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep is being redesigned to address corrosion issues and the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System requires design changes to perform in all environmental conditions. An airborne mine countermeasures system was decertified and its tow cable is being redesigned following the results of testing with the helicopter. The Navy also decertified the Remote Minehunting System during testing in 2007 due to reliability issues, and, according to officials, results of a recent operational assessment are pending. The Navy now plans to deliver the third and fourth mission packages in fiscal year 2011 and has delayed delivery of the baseline package until fiscal year 2012.

The first of 24 SUW packages was delivered in July 2008 and included 1 of 2 planned mission systems. The SUW package includes the fully mature 30mm gun and a variant of the Army's Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) system (missile and launcher), which is nearing maturity. The first package consisted of two gun engineering development models, without the NLOS launcher or missiles. The NLOS design for LCS has not yet been validated. Integration of the gun with LCS is not complete. A design review for the gun module is scheduled for October 2009. Delivery of a baseline package has been delayed to fiscal year 2013.

The first of 16 ASW packages was delivered in September 2008 and included 4 of 10 planned mission systems. Three systems remain immature including the Unmanned Surface Vehicle's Dipping Sonar, the Remotely Towed Array and the Remotely Towed Array Source. Failure to develop these technologies as expected could increase reliance on the MH-60R helicopter. The Navy has delayed delivery of a second ASW package until fiscal year 2011, and delayed baseline capability from fiscal year 2011 to 2013.

The development cost of the LCS packages has increased by more than $300 million, or 64 percent since last year. Procurement costs have decreased for MCM, in part because the delivery of the more expensive baseline capability has been delayed. Reductions in fiscal year 2008 and 2009 budget requests have slowed mission package procurement to account for continuing delays in seaframe acquisition. The explanatory statement accompanying DOD Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2009 Congress asked the Navy to develop a plan for fielding the MCM capability independent of LCS.

The program office indicates all packages are currently scheduled to undergo operational assessments with both LCS seaframe designs, beginning in June 2010. According to program officials, in September 2008, the Navy conducted a shore based integration exercise using simulated seaframe mission bays. Officials note this activity accelerated MCM mission package integration with both seaframes and reinforced previous crew training.

Program officials noted that changes to the program between the 2008 and 2009 president's budgets resulted in an apparent increased development cost. Costs for the SUW package bought in fiscal year 2009 were realigned from procurement to development to support technical and operational evaluations. In addition, data provided to GAO for last year's assessment did not include costs of common equipment that was subsequently distributed among the MCM and ASW packages. The program office acknowledges technical maturity challenges for some mission systems and is working closely with mission system program offices to resolve any issues. The program office is leading a coordinated test approach to prove mission package capabilities and suitability for fleet delivery. The program office also provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.

by globalsecurity.org